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The Eﬀ  ect of Subsidizing Continuous Training 
Investments – Evidence from German 
Establishment Data
Abstract
This paper evaluates the impact of a training voucher program on establishments’ 
investments in further training. The voucher program that was implemented in the 
German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia increased training incentives for 
employees in small and medium-sized establishments by reducing training costs by 
50%. The estimation is based on a quasi-experimental research design exploiting 
variation across time, regions and establishment size. Using establishment data, I ﬁ  nd 
that the share of establishments that invest in training increased by approximately 5 
percentage points. Training intensity and the educational structure of participants 
remained unaﬀ  ected among those establishments investing in training.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: J24, H25
Keywords: Continuous training, employers, training voucher, subsidies, diﬀ  erence-
in-diﬀ  erence
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1. Introduction 
Demographic change, skill gaps and the depreciation of human capital by technological 
change might be the reason why further training is on the top of the political agenda in many 
countries. For instance, European policy makers aim for increasing adults’ participation in 
lifelong learning and for improving the quality of training programs and institutions (Lisbon 
Strategy, Education and Training 2010 Work Programme). Although it is fairly unexplored 
whether market failures exist in the training market, political interventions could also be 
justified on grounds of equity issues by allocating resources to disadvantaged groups. 
Furthermore, poaching externalities and credit market constraints are seen as likely (Bassanini 
et al. 2007). There are different ways how politicians can provide training incentives, e.g. by 
offering training subsidies or tax deductions.
1  
According to human capital theory, the decision to invest in continuous training is determined 
by comparing the discounted present value of training returns with training costs (Becker 
1964). The provision of training subsidies aims to stimulate training by reducing the cost 
component of the investment decision. However, the effectiveness of such programs is not 
clear in advance. While financial assistance could increase training investments especially if 
there is under-provision in the training market, there might be no impact of subsidies on 
training in the presence of windfall gains, i.e. if they fully substitute private with public 
spending.  
Previous evaluation studies find mixed results on the effect of financial grants on training. 
This is not surprising because the design and the details of the training programs differ across 
countries. Holzer et al. (1993) provide evidence that training subsidies increase hours of 
training in manufacturing firms in the US. Using Irish firm data, Görg and Strobl (2006) find 
positive effects of government subsidies on training expenditures for domestic plants, while 
there is no effect in foreign-owned plants. By contrast, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) find no 
direct effect of the introduction of a Dutch tax law reducing training costs for workers over 
the age of 40. If the design of a program determines its success, gaining insights which 
programs are most effective helps to improve future programs. 
In this paper, I will evaluate the short-term effect of a specific training policy that was 
implemented in one of the federal states of Germany in January 2006. In particular, the state 
government of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) implemented a training voucher system 
(Bildungsscheck) that reduced direct training costs per course by the substantial amount of 
50%. The voucher was targeted to increase training participation of employees working in 
establishments with fewer than 250 employees. Receiving a voucher was also restricted to 
employees who did not participate in training in the previous and in the current year. 
Although the program is not only available for a particular socio-economic group, low 
qualified workers might still be more likely to obtain a voucher because they are more likely 
to meet the restriction on no previous participation. Attendance in the program was enormous. 
In the first 1.5 years almost 140,000 vouchers were issued. Both employees and 
establishments could obtain vouchers. In this paper, I will concentrate on establishments, i.e. 
the impact of the voucher on training activities of German establishments will be analyzed. 
                                                
1 Another possibility is to impose training levies for non-training firms. Since this study focuses on the 
effectiveness of programs that subsidize training by co-financing training costs, they will not be investigated any 
further.  5 
Even though it would be interesting to analyze how individuals’ training participation 
changed, I have no data to answer this question. However, focusing on establishments is 
interesting as well given the fact that continuous training is mostly financed by firms rather 
than by employees (Pischke 2001). Therefore, increasing firms’ investments in training will 
also affect training participation of employees.  
Using data from the IAB Establishment Panel, I investigate how the NRW voucher affects 
training activities of establishments operating in the private sector. Training is measured as: 
(i) the decision to undertake training investments (training incidence), (ii) the fraction of 
employees participating in training in relation to all employees within establishments 
investing in training (training intensity), (iii) the fraction of participants with no vocational 
degree again conditional on training establishments. Three empirical strategies are applied in 
order to make sure that the results are robust. First, I use a difference-in-difference estimator 
utilizing variation across time and federal states. Secondly, the same estimator is applied 
exploiting variation across time and establishment size. Finally, a difference-in-difference-in-
difference method is estimated using all of the three dimensions (i.e. temporal, regional and 
size-specific variation). Since I am using data from 2001 to 2007, I can also test for 
anticipation effects (Ashenfelter 1978), i.e. whether establishments decreased training the year 
before the voucher was implemented. The results show that the NRW training voucher 
increased the proportion of establishments investing in training by approximately 5 
percentage points which represents a remarkable increase. Among training establishments, 
there is no evidence that training intensity and the skill structure of participants were affected. 
There is no evidence for anticipation effects which is not surprising as the program was 
announced at short notice.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the voucher program in detail. 
The data and empirical specification are shown in section 3. Section 4 provides regression 
results and the last section concludes the study. 
2. Background: The Introduction of the Training Voucher 
In January 2006, the state government of NRW implemented the training voucher 
(Bildungsscheck) that is co-financed by the European Social Fund (ESF). The voucher 
reduced training costs by 50% per course up to a maximum of 750 Euro, i.e. the subsidy per 
voucher was limited to 750 Euro at most. The program represents a sizable training incentive 
by reducing training costs by a substantial amount. All employees who work in an 
establishment with fewer than 250 employees, who live in NRW and who did not participate 
in training during the year of application and the previous year could obtain the voucher.
2
Firms that meet the size requirement and that are located in NRW could also get training 
vouchers for their workers. Again, they have to assure that these workers did not attend 
training in the current and previous year. The number of vouchers employees or 
establishments could receive was unlimited.  
The voucher is issued at information centers which are mainly chambers of commerce and 
industry or other organizations promoting economic development. These agencies are also 
responsible for verifying voucher requirements. There are around 200 agencies widely spread 
throughout NRW. Each voucher can be used for a single course only by a single person. The 
                                                
2 Some individuals are excluded such as employees working in the public sector or apprentices as well as 
recipients of unemployment or social welfare benefits.6 
voucher contains information on the content of training, three potential training institutions 
and an expiry date. Only work-related courses organized and held by accredited training 
institutions are subsidized. Establishments can only use the vouchers to cover direct training 
costs in the form of fees for participation of workers in external training courses, while 
expenses for internal courses conducted by firm’s staff and indirect training expenses (e.g. for 
releasing employees from work) are not covered by the voucher. The program was announced 
on January 13, 2006 and introduced just ten days later. There was little information 
concerning the program in the media beforehand.
3   
Figure 1 depicts the monthly development of vouchers issued by the agencies to 
establishments and employers. From January 2006 to June 2007, 142,248 vouchers were 
issued, of whom establishments received more than 60%. The program became increasingly 
popular during the first 1.5 years after its introduction. While vouchers were already well 
demanded shortly after introduction, the peak of vouchers issued per month was in the first 
half of 2007.
4 Not only was there a large demand for these vouchers, but they were also 
frequently used for training. The average redemption rate of the vouchers issued to 
establishments was almost 70% in the period under investigation. However, it is questionable 
whether redeemed vouchers represent merely windfalls because the training investments 
would have occurred also in the absence of the program. This paper addresses this question, 
analyzing whether the financial assistance provided by the voucher actually stimulated 
training investments of German establishments. 
Figure 1: Training vouchers issued to employees or establishments from 
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Source: BISAM Verwaltungsdaten
5
                                                
3 For more information on details of the vocher program see Moraal (2007).  
4 The decline in June 2007 is due to tightened entitlement requirements. However, the new regulations are not of 
importance for this paper as training in the first half of 2007 is examined.  
5 I would like to thank the G.I.B. in NRW for providing me with statistics on the number of issued vouchers 
from the process data of the voucher program. 7 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimator 
A difference-in-difference approach (DD) is applied to answer the question whether the 
introduction of the voucher increased employers’ training investments. In general, this 
approach compares the development of an outcome variable across time between a treatment 
and a well-defined comparison group. The concrete choice of the comparison group is crucial 
for the validity of the estimation technique. For the DD estimator, two different treatment-
comparison groups are used: First, I exploit the fact that training vouchers were introduced 
only in the federal state NRW in January 2006. In this case, the DD estimator compares the 
training development of establishments in NRW across time with the development of other 
German federal states (in the following referred to as DD1). Second, there is some variation 
by firm size because only firms with fewer than 250 employees had access to the voucher. 
The second DD estimator (henceforth referred to as DD2)
6 compares the training 
development before and after the introduction of the reform between small and large 
establishments.
(1) When using variation across time and regions for calculating the DD1, it has to be 
assumed that training investments of establishments located in NRW would have changed 
in a similar way as training investments of establishments out of the states used as a 
comparison group in the absence of the reform. Which of the other states most likely 
fulfill this assumption and represent therefore an appropriate comparison is not clear-cut a 
priori. NRW is the largest German state in terms of population and the second largest in 
terms of area. It is located in West Germany on the Dutch and Belgian border. East 
German federal states do not represent an appropriate comparison group because training 
levels and training determinants differ compared to West Germany (Goerlitz 2009). City 
states are also not taken into consideration because firms’ training activities might 
underlie different mechanisms in areas where firm density is high and poaching 
externalities might be a more serious problem (Mühlemann and Wolter 2007).  
From the seven remaining states, I have compared the pre-reform development of the 
fraction of establishments that undertake investments in training.
7 A similar development 
of training incidence across time was found between NRW and the federal states Lower 
Saxony, Hesse and Baden-Wuerttemberg (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). In these states, 
training incidence increased between 1997 and 1999, dropped sharply in 2001 and 
increased again in 2003. Between 2003 and 2005, the tendencies develop differently 
between the states. However, these differences are not statistically significant from each 
other causing no estimation problems. In conclusion, Lower Saxony, Hesse and Baden-
Wuerttemberg will be used as comparison group. They rank among the West German 
states with the highest population, area and number of establishments. 
Even if training investments evolved similarly within federal states before the reform, 
contemporaneous shocks might limit the validity of the identification strategy. For 
                                                
6 A regression discontinuity design, which is an alternative technique to exploit the variation by firm size for 
identification, could not be applied additionally because of too low sample sizes in the group of establishments 
that have exactly 300 employees or just a little more than this threshold.  
7 For ease of exposition, I do not show additionally the development of the other outcome variables, i.e. of 
training intensity and of the skill structure of participants, because they look fairly similar.   8 
instance, various other training programs were financed within the framework of the ESF 
on the federal level. However, there seems to be no program comparable to the NRW 
training voucher in terms of accessibility to a wide range of employees and firms as well 
as in terms of its demand. Anyway, to check the robustness of the results, I run a variety 
of sensitivity analyses such as looking at different reference years, applying placebo-tests 
and using every of the three federal states as comparison in separate regressions. 
Figure 2: Pre-reform development of training 
incidence in NRW and in states used as 
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Figure 3: Pre-reform development of training 
incidence in NRW and in states not used as 

























































Using the chosen federal states as comparison, the effect is estimated by pooled OLS: 
1, 1 DD1, 1 '( * ) '
T
it DD t DD i t i it DD it
t
Y t NRW t NRW X α γ ηδ β ε =+ + + + +                                            (1) 
where Y indicates the outcome variable, t is a vector of time dummies (t=01, 03, 05, 07) 
and NRW is a dummy variable that is 1 if the establishment i is located in NRW and 0 if it 
is located in Lower Saxony, Hesse or Baden-Wuerttemberg.
8 α is a constant and  , it ε is an 
idiosyncratic error term. The outcome variables are measured at the extensive and 
intensive margin, in particular as a binary variable indicating (i) whether an establishment 
sponsored training and (ii) as the fraction of trained employees related to all employees 
(conditional on training investments), respectively. Furthermore, (iii) the skill structure of 
training participants conditional on investment is also used as an outcome to find out 
which workers are induced to participate in training by the voucher program.
9 Of course, 
each of the three outcomes is considered in separate regressions. The vector X contains a 
set of establishment characteristics that will be introduced in detail in the data section. The 
vector  1, DD t δ  contains time trends of training between NRW and the comparison states, 
with  1,07 DD δ  representing the causal effect of the training voucher. If establishments 
anticipated the reform and postponed training investments (Ashenfelters’ Dip), it would 
                                                
8 The advantage of including a vector of time dummies (rather than including only one binary variable 
distinguishing the pre- and post-reform period) is to check directly whether there are also statistically significant 
effects in other years. If there are indeed significant results, this could point at the existence of contemporaneous 
shocks that could bias my results. 
9 In the literature, training activities of firms are also measured as training expenditures which is not possible in 
this paper because this information is not available in the data. For this study, training expenditures might not be 
the best outcome anyway because it does not show whether the aim of the program of increasing the fraction of 
training participants is fulfilled or whether the voucher leads to visiting more expensive courses. 9 
be observed that  1,05 0 DD δ <  is statistically significant. Only establishments with fewer 
than 250 employees are considered for the analyses.  
(2) When defining the comparison group by establishment size to estimate the DD2, the 
identification assumption for this estimator requires that training activities would have 
exhibited the same tendency in small and medium-sized as well as in large establishments, 
if the voucher had not been introduced. I define small and medium-sized establishments as 
establishments having fewer than 250 employees and large establishments are defined as 
those having more than 300 employees.
10 I use the cutoff point of 300 because the 
information on size refers to the end of June of the previous year in the data. However, 
voucher applicants must fulfill the size restriction at the time of application. Using more 
than 250 employees as the comparison group contains therefore the hazard of having 
treated establishments in the comparison group. Figure 4 contains the time trends in 
training incidence by establishment size. Although there are extensive differences in the 
level per year, time trends look fairly similar.  
Figure 4: Development of training incidence by 
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Year
<250 >=300
The empirical implementation of the DD2, that is also estimated by OLS, is:  
2, 2 DD2, 2 '( * ) '
T
it DD t DD i t i it DD it
t
Yt S t S X α γ ηδ β ε =+ + + + +                                                (2) 
where one difference compared to equation (1) is that the variable NRW is exchanged by a 
dummy variable S that is set to 1 if establishment size is smaller than 250 and 0 if it is 
larger than 300. Furthermore, the analysis is restricted to establishments that are located in 
NRW. The coefficients of interest are now denoted as  2,07 DD δ  (for the voucher effect) and 
as  2,05 DD δ  (for the anticipation effect). Since establishment characteristics are very likely 
to differ to a large extent between smaller and large establishments, inserting control 
variables X is of particular importance for this specification.  
3.2 Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Estimator 
Finally, variation by time, states and size is used to estimate a difference-in-difference-in-
difference estimator (henceforth DDD).
11 The DDD estimator is calculated as the difference 
of the development of training activities before and after the reform between small and 
                                                
10 Size is calculated as the number of employees excluding apprentices because the firm size requirement for 
voucher recipients does not count apprentices either. 
11 For an application of this model see Gruber (1994), Gruber and Poterba (1994), Hamermesh and Trejo (2000).  10 
medium sized establishments located in NRW and small and medium sized establishments 
located in other states from its counterpart of larger establishments.  




(* ) (* ) (* * ) '
it DDD t DD i DD i DDD i i
TT T
DD t i DD t i t i i it DDD it
tt t
Yt N R WS N R W S
tN R W tS tN R WS X
αγ η η η
δδ δ β ε
=+ + + +
++ + + +  
                              (3)                        
where all variables were already described in equation (1) and (2). Again, three different 
training outcomes are considered. The causal effect of the program is now  ,07 DDD δ , it is 
obtained by the third-level interaction of the time dummy for 2007 with the binary variable 
for NRW and the size dummy. Note that the vector of interactions of NRW with time ( 1, DD t δ ) 
and the vector of interactions of size with time ( 2, DD t δ ) do no longer contain the causal effect. 
They need to be introduced, however, to obtain the causal effect  ,07 DDD δ . 
Even though the outcome variables are calculated differently (e.g. as binary or fractional 
variable), estimation is accomplished for each of the three identification strategies by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Results of sensitivity analysis using more appropriate 
estimation techniques are provided as well. In all empirical specifications, standard errors are 
clustered at the establishment level to take serial correlation into account that is caused by 
multiple observations of a single establishment across time.  
It should be kept in mind that the estimated effect might not only be due to the introduction of 
the training voucher, but it could also encompass other education or training reforms targeted 
at small and medium-sized establishments that were implemented in NRW after 2005. 
However, since the voucher program was substantial in terms of its demand, I will interpret 
the estimated effect as the causal effect of the voucher in the following. This is because it is 
very likely that the estimated effect is driven fully or at least to a large extent by the voucher 
program. Anyway, it should be noted that some part of the effect might also be the result of 
other reforms.  
3.3 Data 
The empirical investigation is based on the Establishment Panel that is conducted annually by 
the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in Nuremburg.
12 The panel covers the time 
period from 1993 to 2007 in West Germany and from 1996 to 2007 in East Germany. It is 
representative of all German establishments having at least one employee in receipt of social 
security which are approximately 80% of the German workforce. In a regular two-year cycle 
detailed training questions referring to the last six months are asked. A variable for training 
incidence is generated indicating whether establishments financed employee training either by 
covering direct costs of training or by providing training during working hours. Furthermore, 
establishments indicate how many employees were trained which is used to create a measure 
of training intensity, i.e. by relating the number of trained employees to the size of the 
                                                
12 See Kölling (2000) for a more detailed description of the data. 11 
establishment.
13 The skill structure of participants is analyzed by a variable for low-skilled 
participants relating the number of participants with no vocational degree to the overall 
number of participants.
14  
The data contains a variety of establishment characteristics that were used frequently in the 
literature on the determinants of training (Lynch and Black 1998, Frazis et al. 2000, Zwick 
2004). Dummy variables for the provision of apprenticeship training, investments in physical 
capital (e.g. information technology, logistics, machines and other equipment, real estate), 
having newest technological equipment and for the existence of a works council and 
collective wage agreement are introduced in the regression. Furthermore, the share of workers 
with vocational degree, the fraction of females and part-time employees are included as 
additional controls. Establishment size is introduced in logarithmic form. Seven 1-digit 
industry dummies and three dummies indicating whether the establishment is a single firm, an 
headquarter or a subsidiary of another company are incorporated.  
The analysis comprises data from the time period 2001-2007. This restriction was imposed 
because sample sizes were increased in 2001 allowing representative calculations on the level 
of federal states. Non-profit organizations and public administrations are excluded from the 
analysis as their reasons and conditions to train are assumed to differ from private sector 
establishments. 17,315 year-establishment observations remain for the analysis of whom 
5,614 observations belong to NRW. Approximately 82% have small and medium size and 
18% are larger than 300 employees. All in all, the sample consists of more than 8,100 
establishments. For a definition and description of the variables used in the analysis, see Table 
A-1 in the Appendix. 
4. Results 
The impact of training vouchers on training incidence is presented in Table 1. For ease of 
exposition, no control variables are depicted in the following tables but they are shown in the 
Appendix in Table A-2. The signs of the control variables are in line with the literature on the 
determinants of training and will therefore not be discussed in detail.
15 When applying the 
DD1 and the DD2 estimator, there is a statistically significant increase in training incidence in 
2007 compared to 2001 on the amount of 5-6 percentage points. The coefficient on the DDD 
is not statistically significant, however, the coefficient is positive and has an amount of 3 
percentage points. There is no evidence of an anticipation effect because  05 δ  is not 
statistically significantly negative and the size of the coefficient is close to zero. When 
applying difference-in-difference methods, running placebo-tests is often used to check the 
sensitivity of the results. The idea is to find out whether there are also statistically significant 
results in other years than the year of treatment. Results of such tests can already be identified 
in Table 1. Comparing 2001 with the placebo year 2003 or 2005 shows no statistically 
significant results. 
                                                
13 This information is not available for all training establishments because establishments have to choose whether 
they report the number of employees participating in training or the overall number of participants. I use the 
number of trained employees because more than ¾ of establishments report this information. 
14 I also estimated results for the fraction of high-skilled participants as dependent variable. Since these results 
are identical to those when using the fraction of low-skilled participants, albeit with opposite sign, I omitted 
them from the paper. It should be noted, however, that my results are valid for both skill groups.  
15 For a more detailed discussion of the results see e.g. Zwick (2004) or Goerlitz (2009). 12 
Table 1: The effect of the training voucher on training incidence 
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
δDD1,01 δDD2,01 δDDD,01
δDD1,03 -0.003 0.020 δDD2,03 0.009 0.026 δDDD,03 -0.021 0.030
δDD1,05 -0.008 0.020 δDD2,05 0.018 0.026 δDDD,05 -0.029 0.031
δDD1,07 0.051 ** 0.020 δDD2,07 0.062 ** 0.026 δDDD,07 0.030 0.032
NNN
F-stat F-stat F-stat 238.97 ***
0.30 0.35







Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.




Notes: The standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. The control variables are apprenticeship, 
works council, collective wage agreement, investments in physical capital, the state of the technical equipment 
and the fraction of females, workers with vocational degree and with part-time contract. Furthermore, size is 
introduced in logarithmic form and seven dummies for industry and three dummies indicating if the 
establishment is a single firm, subsidiary or headquarter are incorporated.  
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%., * 10%. 
+ DD-estimates, treatment group: NRW, comparison group: other 
federal states (Lower Saxony, Hesse and Baden-Wuerttemberg); 
++DD-estimates, treatment group: employer 
size<250, comparison group: employer size>300; 
+++ DDD-estimates using variation in size and across federal 
states.
As using 2001 as reference category is arbitrary, I also run sensitivity regressions replacing 
2001 with 2003. Results when comparing 2007 with 2003 instead of 2001 are shown in Table 
2. Each of the three estimation techniques now produce statistically significant results of 
around 5 percentage points which is why I conclude that my results are robust to using a 
different reference year. As an additional sensitivity check, Table 3 contains estimation results 
when comparing NRW separately with each of the three comparison states. Statistically 
significant results on the amount of 5 to 6 percentage points emerge which reinforces the main 
results once again. 
Table 2: The effect of the training voucher on training incidence, reference year: 2003 
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
δDD1,03 δDD2,03 δDDD,03
δDD1,05 -0.005 0.020 δDD2,05 0.009 0.025 δDDD,05 -0.008 0.030




207.77 *** 86.7 *** 207.8 ***










Notes: Year 2001 is dropped from the regression. For further details see notes in Table 1.  
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%., * 10% 13 
Table 3: Results for training incidence using each state as comparison in separate regressions, DD1 estimation
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
δDD1,01
δDD1,03 0.034 0.026 0.003 0.026 -0.040 0.025
δDD1,05 0.020 0.026 -0.032 0.027 -0.009 0.025




Reference Year Reference Year Reference Year
0.30 0.30 0.31
Lower Saxony Hesse Baden-Wuerttemberg 
7,559
141.57 *** 135.8 *** 150.88 ***
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
2 R
Notes: For further details see notes in Table 1. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%., * 10%
Again for reasons of sensitivity, Figure 2 and Figure 3 already presented in Section 3 are 
depicted once again, now extended by the post-reform year 2007. The development of 
training incidence by states is contained in Figure 5 (left-hand panel) and it is contained by 
establishment size in Figure 5 (right-hand panel). Although these figures can only be 
interpreted in a descriptive manner, they provide some indication that training incidence 
indeed increased in both establishments located in NRW and in smaller establishments.  
Figure 5: Descriptive results in graphical form for training incidence (left-hand panel: using other states as 
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To sum up, all of the three identification strategies yield positive coefficients that are in most 
cases statistically significant. Training vouchers increased establishments’ probability to 
invest in continuous training on average by 5 percentage points. This represents an increase of 
12% when comparing it to the average fraction of training establishments in NRW in 2005 
(41%). It should be noted that I cannot distinguish whether this increase reflects that 
previously non-training establishments are now induced to train or whether establishments 
train more frequently. This is because training is measured only at the first half of each year, 
not encompassing all training activities during the year.  
To find out which establishments were induced to train by the voucher, I have also estimated 
heterogeneous effects for the DD1 by establishment size and the fraction of workers with a 
vocational degree (see Table 4). For establishments having fewer than 50 employees, there is 
no statistically significant effect while there is a large impact for medium-sized 
establishments of 7.5 percentage points. This finding is consistent with the fact that 
establishments with medium size were more likely to be informed about the program 
compared to establishments with smaller size (Moraal 2007). Separating establishments by 
the skill level of their workforce shows that the effect is more pronounced when the average 14 
fraction of employees with a vocational degree exceeds 50%. However, the difference is less 
pronounced. 
Table 4: The effect of the training voucher on training incidence, heterogeneous effects
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
δDD1,01 δDD1,01
δDD1,03 -0.015 0.026 0.021 0.031 δDD1,03 0.037 0.045 -0.016 0.023
δDD1,05 -0.012 0.026 -0.007 0.032 δDD1,05 0.024 0.047 -0.019 0.023
δDD1,07 0.039 0.026 0.075 ** 0.031 δDD1,07 0.040 0.047 0.050 ** 0.023
NN
F-stat F-stat
Reference Year Reference Year Reference Year









Percentage of skilled employees
0-49 50-100
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
64.37 *** 185.69 ***
2 R
2 R
Notes: For further details see notes in Table 1. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%., * 10%
Table 5 reports regression results for training intensity conditional on training establishments 
(for the full estimation results see Table A-3 in the Appendix). There are no statistically 
significant effects when using other federal states as a comparison group or applying the DDD 
method. However, when comparing training intensity of establishments with different sizes in 
NRW (DD2), a positive and statistically significant coefficient appears. To find out whether 
this result may represent the causal effect on training intensity, I run a variety of sensitivity 
checks. When using 2003 as the base category, there are also no statistically significant results 
at the 5% level. The result also holds when using each of the comparison states in separate 
regressions. As most of the estimators yield coefficients that are not statistically different 
from zero, I conclude that there is no impact of the voucher on training intensity. In Table 6, 
results are shown for the fraction of participants with no vocational degree. Table A-4 in the 
Appendix contains full regression results including all control variables. None of the three 
estimation methods suggest that there is any effect of the introduction of the training voucher 
on the dispersion of participants with respect to their education. 
Table 5: The effect of the training voucher on training intensity conditional on the investment decision
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
δDD1,01 δDD2,01 δDDD,01
δDD1,03 0.031 * 0.017 δDD2,03 0.016 0.030 δDDD,03 0.030 0.037
δDD1,05 0.012 0.016 δDD2,05 0.035 0.027 δDDD,05 0.016 0.034






Reference Year Reference Year Reference Year
DD1
+
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
8,485
0.23 0.21 0.22
65.67 *** 21.77 *** 52.26 ***
7,111 2,624
2 R
Notes: For further details see notes in Table 1. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%., * 10% 15 
Table 6: The effect of the training voucher on the share of workers with no vocational degree that participate in 
training conditional on the investment decision 
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
δDD1,01 δDD2,01 δDDD,01
δDD1,03 0.013 0.016 δDD2,03 0.058 * 0.027 δDDD,03 0.057 * 0.033
δDD1,05 0.007 0.015 δDD2,05 0.032 0.029 δDDD,05 0.043 0.035
δDD1,07 0.000 0.014 δDD2,07 0.017 0.029 δDDD,07 0.022 0.035
N
F-stat





Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
36.54 *** 17.3 *** 36.6 ***
7,033 2,572 8,347
0.29 0.30 0.28 2 R
Notes: For further details see notes in Table 1. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%., * 10% 
Some additional sensitivity checks were applied that did not affect the estimation results. 
First, I deleted large establishments with more than 2000 employees from the sample. Second, 
I estimated the impact on training incidence with a Probit-model which is the more 
appropriate model when looking at a binary dependent variable. For ease of exposition, I have 
generated a dummy-variable differentiating only the pre- and the post-reform period ( Reform t ) 
which was interacted with the regional dummy NRW (i.e. the results should be equivalent to 
DD1) and with the size dummy S (i.e. the results should be equivalent to DD2). The marginal 
effects of the interaction terms  Reform t *NRW  and  Reform t *S are calculated as suggested by 
Norton et al. (2004) to obtain an estimate of the causal effect of the reform. The marginal 
effects are close to the results already presented. When using other federal states as 
comparison, the marginal effect is 5 percentage points and it is statistically significant. When 
using size as the comparison group, the results are not statistically significant but the 
coefficient has a sign of 4 percentage points which is similar to the previous results. 
In conclusion, my results suggest that the voucher introduced in NRW had a positive impact 
on training incidence, while it has no effect on training intensity and on the fraction of 
participants with no vocational degree. Several reasons could be suggested for this finding. 
First, one explanation might be that vouchers represent mere windfalls in training active 
establishments, i.e. they are used to finance training that would have occurred anyway. 
Second, those establishments that are induced to offer training by the voucher system might 
have a lower intensity. In this case, the average training intensity would remain constant, even 
though there was an increase in the training intensity of establishments that already invested 
before the voucher was introduced. As the fraction of new establishments is relatively small 
with about 5 percentage points compared to establishments that trained already in 2005 
(41%), this can hardly fully explain my findings.  
Third, it might be that participation of employees eligible for training are now preferred to 
employees not eligible for training in establishments already engaged in training. In this case, 
the voucher would merely lead to an exchange of participants. This is not corroborated by the 
evidence, though, since it does not suggest that the educational structure of participants is 
affected by the voucher. As the voucher can only be used for external training, it might be that 
internal training or informal training measures are displaced. Unfortunately, distinguishing 
between these explanations remains a topic for future research because the data set at hand 
does not allow such an analysis, although it would be of political interest. Fourth, another 
explanation could be that the training voucher is an instrument particularly attractive to 
establishments that invested less frequently in training of their workforce. This explanation 16 
also appears reasonable because of the eligibility criteria. Employees were only eligible for 
the voucher if they did not participate in training in the previous and current year. Therefore, 
establishments with no or only little training investments the time before the voucher was 
introduced were more often eligible as well. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of a training policy that was implemented in the 
German federal state NRW. Using a quasi-experimental research design that exploits 
variation across time, regions and establishment size, it explores the short-term causal effect 
of the NRW training voucher program on training investments of establishments. The 
estimation results suggest that the training voucher increased the fraction of establishments 
investing in training by approximately 5 percentage points. This could indicate either that 
training investments occur more frequently due to the voucher program or that the fraction of 
firms generally willing to invest in training increased, or both. Especially establishments of 
medium size are induced to invest in training. There is only weak evidence that training 
intensity and the educational structure of participants within training establishments were 
affected by the training policy. There is no evidence of an anticipation effect. 
From these results, some conclusions can be drawn. The program was not only successful in 
terms of its demand because more than 140,000 vouchers were issued within the first 1.5 
years. Vouchers issued to establishments also increased the share of establishments 
sponsoring training. Based on these results, introducing this program in other federal states 
should actually be effective in increasing firms’ training investments in the short-run. 
However, it is important to emphasize that long-run effects are not yet explored. If firms 
decrease their training investments in consequence of the subsidy and therefore only account 
for lower training investments in their budget, long-run effects might even be negative 
especially when the program once ended. Therefore, long-run effects need to be investigated 
further in future research.  
Another interesting topic for future research would be the investigation of the impact on 
individuals. Using data from a natural field experiment, Messer and Wolter (2009) evaluate 
the impact of adult education vouchers on training participation of individuals in Switzerland. 
They show that vouchers actually increased training participation, even though the 
deadweight loss is high. Training decisions of firms and individuals might differ to a large 
extent and therefore also the effectiveness of training programs. For instance, the poaching 
risk is only a problem for firms. In contrast, firms might have better information concerning 
training returns because they know first about the introduction of new technologies, new 
machines or organizational change that all might require learning activities.  
Estimating the returns of voucher-financed training for establishments is an interesting topic 
in itself. Returns for establishments are usually measured in terms of productivity increases. 
Even though it was found that continuous training tends to increase establishment 
productivity in Germany (Zwick 2006), it is ambiguous whether there is also a positive impact 
of voucher-sponsored training. No effect would result if vouchers are used for less effective 
training. It could also represent a selection effect, if firms induced to train by the voucher 
have lower returns.  17 
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Appendix 
Table A-1: Description of variables and sample means
Variables Description
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Training incidence Dummy is 1 if training investments were undertaken 5,606 0.65 11,690 0.68
Training intensity  Fraction of trained employees to all workers (cond. on train.) 2,858 0.31 6,355 0.31
Fraction of participants with no vocat. degree (cond. on train.) 2,800 0.11 6,254 0.10
Investments in ICT Dummy is 1 if investments in ICT 5,579 0.55 11,650 0.58
Investments in real estate Dummy is 1 if investments in real estate 5,579 0.18 11,650 0.19
Investments in machines Dummy is 1 if investments in machines 5,579 0.50 11,650 0.53
Investments in logistics Dummy is 1 if investments in logistics 5,579 0.25 11,650 0.26
Excellent state of techn. Dummy is 1 if technical equipment is excellent 5,584 0.18 11,659 0.18
Apprenticeship Dummy is 1 if at least one apprentice at establishment 5,614 0.53 11,696 0.53
Work council Dummy is 1 if work council at establishment 5,465 0.42 11,405 0.40
Collective wage agreement Dummy is 1 if covered by collective wage agreement 5,610 0.64 11,688 0.60
Fraction skilled workers Share of workers with vocational degree 5,605 0.72 11,687 0.72
Fraction females Share of female workers 5,599 0.40 11,682 0.42
Fraction part-time workers  Share of workers with a part-time contract 5,582 0.20 11,646 0.22
Establishment size Logarithm of size of establishment 5,614 3.68 11,701 3.59
Type of firm
   Separate enterprise  Dummy is 1 if separate enterprise/ single firm 5,544 0.69 11,521 0.67
   Headquarter Dummy is 1 if headquarter 5,544 0.11 11,521 0.12
   Subsidiary Dummy is 1 if subsidiary (or equivalent) 5,544 0.20 11,521 0.21
Industry
   Agriculture & forestry Dummy: 1 if agriculture & forestry (NACE 1-14, 40/41) 5,614 0.04 11,701 0.04
   Manufacturing Dummy: 1 if manufacturing (NACE 15-37) 5,614 0.28 11,701 0.30
   Construction Dummy: 1 if construction (NACE 45) 5,614 0.08 11,701 0.08
   Trade Dummy: 1 if itrade (NACE 50-52) 5,614 0.17 11,701 0.16
   Communic. & information Dummy: 1 if comm. & inform. transmission (NACE 60-64) 5,614 0.05 11,701 0.04
   Banking and insurance Dummy: 1 if banking and insurance (NACE 65- 67) 5,614 0.04 11,701 0.04




Table A-2: Full estimation results for training incidence 
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Apprenticeship 0.108 *** 0.010 0.109 *** 0.016 0.110 *** 0.009
Work council 0.016 0.012 0.028 0.019 0.034 *** 0.011
Collective wage agreement 0.050 *** 0.009 0.067 *** 0.016 0.047 *** 0.009
Investments in ICT 0.136 *** 0.009 0.127 *** 0.015 0.134 *** 0.009
Investments in real estate 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.014 -0.002 0.008
Investments in machines 0.047 *** 0.009 0.059 *** 0.014 0.048 *** 0.008
Investments in logistics 0.006 0.009 0.030 ** 0.013 0.007 0.008
Excellent state of techn. 0.076 *** 0.010 0.051 *** 0.015 0.069 *** 0.008
Fraction skilled workers 0.234 *** 0.016 0.230 *** 0.025 0.196 *** 0.015
Fraction females 0.113 *** 0.018 0.045 0.030 0.106 *** 0.017
Fraction part-time workers  -0.087 *** 0.020 -0.033 0.035 -0.104 *** 0.019
Establishment size 0.111 *** 0.004 0.096 *** 0.007 0.100 *** 0.004
Separate enterprise  -0.113 *** 0.011 -0.083 *** 0.017 -0.107 *** 0.009
Headquarter -0.127 *** 0.015 -0.079 *** 0.019 -0.107 *** 0.011
Subsidiary
Industry controls 
NRW -0.031 ** 0.016 -0.036 ** 0.018
S 0.146 *** 0.026 0.141 *** 0.016
NRW*S 0.006 0.024
2001
2003 0.044 *** 0.011 0.030 0.020 0.015 0.012
2005 0.050 *** 0.011 0.026 0.020 0.013 0.012
2007 0.032 *** 0.012 0.021 0.021 0.007 0.013
δDD1,01
δDD1,03 -0.003 0.020 0.017 0.023
δDD1,05 -0.008 0.020 0.019 0.024
δDD1,07 0.051 ** 0.020 0.020 0.024
δDD2,01
δDD2,03 0.009 0.026 0.031 * 0.017
δDD2,05 0.018 0.026 0.040 ** 0.017















































Notes: The standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. The finding that there is a positive coefficient 
of the dummy variable S (indicating smaller establishments) might be confusing at first sight because larger 
establishments tend to train more frequently as it also confirmed in the variable establishment size. Anyway, 
using other specifications such as size and a squared term of size does not lead to different results of the causal 
effect. In addition, omitting the continuous variable on establishment size from the regression does also not 
affect the main results. In this case, however, the coefficient of S is now negative confirming indeed a positive 
relationship between establishment size and training. Therefore, I conclude that the positive coefficient of S is 
due to some non-linearities in the relationship between size and training and it should, thus, not be interpreted.
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%., * 10%. 
+ DD-estimates, comparison group: other federal states (Lower 
Saxony,  Hesse and Baden-Wuerttemberg); 
++DD-estimates, comparison group: employer size>300; 
+++ DDD-
estimates using variation in size and across federal states.  21 
Table A-3: Full estimation results for training intensity (conditional on training)
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Apprenticeship -0.025 *** 0.007 -0.049 *** 0.013 -0.033 *** 0.007
Work council 0.028 *** 0.009 -0.001 0.016 0.022 *** 0.008
Collective wage agreement -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.014 -0.001 0.007
Investments in ICT 0.008 0.008 -0.008 0.013 0.008 0.007
Investments in real estate 0.013 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.013 * 0.007
Investments in machines 0.002 0.007 0.028 ** 0.011 0.004 0.007
Investments in logistics 0.011 0.007 0.017 0.012 0.010 0.006
Excellent state of techn. 0.040 *** 0.008 0.059 *** 0.013 0.034 *** 0.007
Fraction skilled workers 0.132 *** 0.016 0.117 *** 0.026 0.126 *** 0.014
Fraction females 0.112 *** 0.017 0.067 ** 0.027 0.094 *** 0.016
Fraction part-time workers  -0.037 * 0.020 -0.004 0.036 -0.043 ** 0.019
Establishment size -0.070 *** 0.004 -0.057 *** 0.006 -0.067 *** 0.003
Separate enterprise  -0.067 *** 0.010 -0.054 *** 0.015 -0.068 *** 0.008
Headquarter -0.038 *** 0.013 -0.035 * 0.018 -0.036 *** 0.010
Subsidiary
Industry controls 
NRW -0.015 0.012 -0.015 0.020
S -0.106 *** 0.023 -0.124 *** 0.015
NRW*S 0.002 0.024
2001
2003 0.057 *** 0.009 0.067 ** 0.026 0.069 *** 0.020
2005 0.043 *** 0.009 0.016 0.024 0.025 0.019
2007 0.051 *** 0.009 -0.012 0.025 0.009 0.020
δDD1,01
δDD1,03 0.031 * 0.017 -0.002 0.033
δDD1,05 0.012 0.016 -0.006 0.030
δDD1,07 0.015 0.016 -0.017 0.032
δDD2,01
δDD2,03 0.016 0.030 -0.010 0.022
δDD2,05 0.035 0.027 0.020 0.021
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Notes: The standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%., * 10%. 
+ DD-estimates, comparison group: other federal states (Lower Saxony,  Hesse and Baden-Wuerttemberg); 
++DD-estimates, comparison group: employer size>300; 
+++ DDD-estimates using variation in size and across 
federal states. 22 
Table A-4: Full estimation results for participants with no vocational degree (conditional on training) 
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Apprenticeship -0.052 *** 0.007 -0.069 *** 0.012 -0.051 *** 0.006
Work council 0.005 0.007 0.023 * 0.013 0.003 0.007
Collective wage agreement -0.005 0.006 -0.005 0.011 -0.006 0.006
Investments in ICT 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.002 0.006
Investments in real estate 0.006 0.007 -0.002 0.011 0.003 0.006
Investments in machines 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.001 0.006
Investments in logistics 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.006
Excellent state of techn. -0.009 0.006 -0.016 * 0.009 -0.010 * 0.005
Fraction skilled workers -0.531 *** 0.019 -0.539 *** 0.029 -0.517 *** 0.017
Fraction females -0.007 0.013 0.003 0.023 -0.007 0.013
Fraction part-time workers  -0.012 0.017 0.020 0.032 -0.009 0.017
Establishment size -0.001 0.003 -0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.003
Separate enterprise  -0.005 0.007 -0.012 0.012 -0.009 0.007
Headquarter -0.004 0.010 0.003 0.017 -0.013 * 0.008
Subsidiary
Industry controls 
NRW 0.001 0.011 0.028 0.021
S -0.055 ** 0.022 -0.022 0.015
NRW*S -0.027 0.024
2001
2003 0.028 *** 0.009 -0.016 0.023 0.025 0.018
2005 0.009 0.008 -0.015 0.026 0.020 0.018
2007 0.003 0.008 -0.013 0.027 0.007 0.018
δDD1,01
δDD1,03 0.013 0.016 -0.043 0.029
δDD1,05 0.007 0.015 -0.037 0.032
δDD1,07 0.000 0.014 -0.023 0.032
δDD2,01
δDD2,03 0.058 * 0.027 0.003 0.020
δDD2,05 0.032 0.029 -0.011 0.020
δDD2,07 0.017 0.029 -0.004 0.019
δDDD,01








































Base Group Base Group Base Group
---
2 R
Notes: The standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%., * 10%. 
+ DD-estimates, comparison group: other federal states (Lower Saxony,  Hesse and Baden-Wuerttemberg); 
++DD-estimates, comparison group: employer size>300; 
+++ DDD-estimates using variation in size and across 
federal states. 